Recent operational risk events such as occurred at Barings, Daiwa, Sumitomo, and other institutions show the importance of measuring and controlling such operational risk. In this paper the authors present a quantitative operational risk measurement model based on extreme value theory.
INTRODUCTION
Events such as those which occurred in Barings, Daiwa, and Sumitomo helped focus attention on an important type of risk which a bank runs, the operational risk (OR), which encompasses de®ciencies in information systems and internal controls, and includes legal and personnel events that could result in unexpected losses. This type of risk is closely associated with human error, system failure, fraud, and inadequate procedures and controls.
Several banks have developed state-of-the-art market and credit risk measurement, management, and pricing tools, but they will not protect a ®nancial institution if, for example, a derivative salesman decides to input a bogus volatility ®gure in a sophisticated option pricing system to make the product more attractive for an investor. This happened recently in a large British investment bank which reported over £90 million of losses due to the poor checking of traders' inputs in their derivatives pricing system. Operational risk related losses can be massive.
We show here that it is possible to develop a quantitative model, very similar to those of credit and market risk, for measuring operational risk.
EXTREME EVENTS
So far, attempts to identify or measure operational risk have been more qualitative than quantitative. The quantitative techniques used in the methodology presented here arise from our interest in the study of extreme risks in ®nancial markets. Extreme events are, by de®nition, uncommon; nevertheless, statistical consequences can be measured. Instinctively, operational risk can be seen likewise. Given a distribution of operational losses for a certain business, we would like to know the behavior of the extreme of this distribution. To test the model, we used a database provided by a large British bank. Owing to the multidimensionality of operational risk, the database of operational losses was split into several dierent categories of operational risk (process risk, people risk, external environment risk, business and strategy risk, and system risk). We will illustrate the methodology here, applied to just one category, process risk, which is the risk that operational problems (such as booking errors, failure to comply with the transaction terms, fraud, etc.) would take place in the bank's transactions. This category of operational risk is useful as an example because it tends to present the largest number of events.
MEASURING OPERATIONAL RISK
A typical operational losses database will present a distribution which is not Gaussian. In general, an operational risk database is composed of a few very large events and several smaller ones. Nevertheless, for some businesses, a registrar's department, for example, due to the huge number of transactions processed daily, a quasinormal distribution of losses could appear. For risk management purposes, we are interested in knowing the behavior of the tail of this curve (the maximum losses). The question to be answered by the risk manager is: how much economic capital should I allocate to a particular business to protect against an eventual operational catastrophe? The answer comes by analyzing the distribution of losses which arise from extreme value distributions.
The application of extreme value theory (EVT), as the theory which supports this type of distribution is known, is still at an embryonic stage in risk management. Some recent work can be seen in Embrechts et al. (1997) and Longin (1997) . Both apply EVT to market risk management problems.
The operational losses on the database provided by the bank can be denoted by X. Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be the monetary losses observed in a certain period. Extremes are de®ned as maxima and minima. Let X 1Yn , . . . , X nYn be the order statistics of this series, with X 1Yn denoting the highest value (the maximum) observed during the period, X 2Yn , the second largest, and so on. To ®nd a nondegenerate limiting distribution, the maximum random variable Y X 1Yn is standardized by location, scale, and shape parameters, chosen to give a proper distribution of standardized extremes. We focus on the asymptotic behavior of the extremes.
Three important extreme value distributions are those de®ned by FreÂ chet, Gumbel, and Weibull. A convenient representation of these is given in the generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution. This three-parameter distribution F $Y"Y2 arises as the limit distribution of normalized maxima of independent identically distributed random variables. It can be represented (in the threeparameter form) as follows.
For the random variableY X 1Yn , we let Z Y À "a2 and z y À "a2Y 1
where " and 2 are location and scale parameters, respectively. Then
where $ is the shape parameter. Letting $ 3 0 gives the Gumbel distribution; $ b 0 gives the FreÂ chet distribution, and $`0 gives the Weibull distribution.
In order to test if the transformed maxima can really be taken to be from an extreme value distribution, the Kolmogorov±Smirnov statistics D , D À , D are used together with the related Kuiper statistic V in tests of ®t (see the Appendix). These tests are for the null hypothesis that a random sample of maxima comes from the extreme value distribution (2).
We applied the methodology to a fraud database (process risk category) composed of 3338 events of fraud and identi®ed potential losses which occurred between 1992 and 1996 (an average of approximately 2 per day over 5 years). Initially, we tested the database at the upper tail signi®cance levels ( 0.10, 0.05, 0.025, 0.01). If the entire database is considered, the skewness and kurtosis ®gures are extremely high, 57.24 and 3294.69, respectively, and, consequently, our distribution is asymmetric, very skewed to the right and leptokurtic. At this level of kurtosis, the passage from`normal' event to`extreme' event is very sudden. Therefore, the methodology chosen was to take the maxima of each month on a 12-month rolling period basis to estimate the parameters and to test the ®tness of the model. Just for illustration, shown below is an example in which we used the maxima of each month of each year (in this case not on a rolling basis but using the maxima from January to December of each year). The parameters of the ®tted GEV were estimated by the L-moments method (Hosking and Wallis 1997) . The results are presented in Table 1 .
The signi®cance points given in Table 5 (see the Appendix) were found for ®tted values of " and 2, treating the estimate of $ as exact. The test is thus less likely to reject than if a testÐnot yet availableÐallowed for the variability in the estimate of $.
We ®nd no evidence for rejecting the GEV model even for very small signi®cance levels based on the Kolmogorov±Smirnov statistics. The parameters of the distribution were quite stable during the period considered except for 1994 (which saw some exceptional massive potential losses) and 1995 (when no major fraud was attempted). In Figures 1 and 2 is shown the behavior of At this point it would be interesting to determine the frequency of these extreme events over some speci®c threshold. This will help in the calculation of economic capital. With that intention we chose an arbitrary threshold 2 of £100,000. Events exceeding this limit will be deemed extreme. The results are shown in Table 2 1 There is insucient data to give useful con®dence bounds. These would need modeling assumptions for the curves as in regression analysis. Potential fraud data will have a dierent pattern of sampling variation from actual fraud data. The two data types are used without distinction here. 2 All the maximum monthly frauds selected for Table 1 were above £100,000, which indicated that a reasonable level for the threshold has been adopted.
Here and in the other ®gures, the estimates for each month are based on the maxima for the 12 months up to and including that month. The entries in Tables 1 to 4 use the December estimates which are based on the 12 maxima for that calendar year.
ECONOMIC CAPITAL FOR OPERATIONAL RISK
Given that we have determined the parameters and chosen the size of the upper tail of the GEV distribution for the fraud data, the problem can be reduced to ®nding the amount of economic capital to cover operational risk. This can be achieved by determining initially the 100p% quantile for the GEV (severity of the losses based on a certain con®dence level), and transforming to the 100p% quantile of the ®tted fraud data distribution, namely
This estimated quantile is called the maximum amount at risk at con®dence level p (MaR p ). The parameters found in Table 1 when applied to the quantile formula (3) gave Table 3 . Owing to the heavy tail characteristics of operational risk data, high quantiles such as 99% can present very high ®gures. The growth starts to be exponentiallike after that. Given this, our advice in this case is to avoid very high quantiles such as 99.99%.
It is important to highlight the fact that the results above re¯ect just the estimation of loss severity (or the economic capital necessary to cover against potential fraud losses, if we decide to be more conservative) for one category of operational risk, process risk. The same procedure should be carried out for each of the remaining categories of operational risk. For the aggregate of economic capital over the categories of operational risk, we cannot then add the amounts obtained separately, since the quantile for the sum cannot be obtained from summing the separate quantiles. The extremes of the entire database over all categories would tend to show values from only the extremely risky categories. The separate values must be interpreted in a multidimensional way, as each carries important information for risk management.
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Based on the parameters estimated on the 12-month rolling period basis, we show in Figure 3 the maximum amount at risk for the 99% con®dence level. Observe that a log-scale is used for the y-axis.
PRICING OPERATIONAL RISK
Generally, market and credit risk managers are more concerned with the size of the losses than their frequency (Embrechts et al. 1998 , Boudoukh et al. 1995 . Although the single use of the loss severity could be a more conservative measure on which to base the allocation of capital, a model similar to those used in insurance mathematics which also includes the frequency can be useful. A similar measure to that used in mathematical risk theory (BuÈ hlmann 1970) and insurance mathematics (Bowers et al. 1997) for the calculation of net premiums could be used, i.e. net premiums total expected claims frequency of the events Â loss severityX With the recent establishment of`risk transfer' companies (RTCs), virtually any type of operational risk can be insured or hedged. The insurance premium charged by these companies would, nevertheless, re¯ect the RTCs' own experiences (or loss expectation if they do not have any previous exposure to a certain`exotic' risk) with a certain type of portfolio. 4 By including the frequency, the ®nancial institution would bene®t by having an instrument to compare its level of losses against equivalent companies' market (this could be seen by checking if the`internal premium' is`cheap' or`expensive' with respect to the premium charged by the RTC) or at least helped in making decisions whether to buy insurance for a certain type of risk or not.
Therefore, after estimating the loss severity, the extreme losses frequency results could be applied to calculate the theoretical`net premium' that the business unit should pay to the group to cover fraud losses. The following formula should then be applied:
where ! is the ratio found in Table 2 and MaR p is the expected losses severity at 100p% con®dence level shown in (3). In Table 4 is presented the theoretical annual net premium given at two con®dence levels (95% and 99%) taking into account the event frequency in each year.
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It is worth mentioning that this type of insurance contract would be called excess-of-loss because it would be covering losses above £100,000. 6 The bank would assume the losses below this level.
Another approach that can be used for pricing operational risk can be borrowed from the application of option theory to insurance (see an early application by Merton (1977) ). When risk managers buy insurance against a certain type of operational risk, arguably they are taking a long position in a call option (the premium) with the right to call an amount from the insurer equivalent to the losses agreed in the policy. Therefore, a framework similar to that used for pricing ®nancial derivatives can be applied in the calculation of insurance premiums and operational risk as well. It is beyond the scope of this article to go deeper on this subject, but the pricing of insurance in a mathematical ®nancial framework will be slightly dierent from pricing derivatives since the stochastic process which underlies the operational related losses is not necessarily a Brownian motion. For more details on this subject, we refer the reader to Geman and Yor (1997) and references therein.
CONCLUSIONS
We believe that the methodology described above provides a reliable and robust means of measuring operational risk in a ®nancial institution as well as determining the appropriate level of economic capital. The model is very similar to value-at-risk-type methodologies used in market and credit risk measurement, making the integration easier. The aggregation of organization risks into a ®rmwide framework is currently seen as one of the most important challenges for global risk managers. The operational risk model shown here is a step towards this aggregation. By including techniques from insurance mathematics such as considering the frequency of an extreme event, a bank could, even if only roughly, compare its level of exposure to a determined type of risk against a`market benchmark' which is the insurer's portfolio; and also check the pricing of the insurance which is currently the most popular hedge against operational risk. This model bene®ts from the fact that it is being piloted in a large bank where it is being re®ned and tested constantly. It should be emphasized that a bigger model is generated in the ®nal aggregation of the results of all operational risk categories and all business units with the inclusion of a variable which evaluates the quality of the`control environment' of each business unit, an optimization model which considers the bank's balance sheet data (income, cost, capital, etc., of each business unit) to help in the capital allocation and the results of a reputational risk model (derived from an econometric model).
APPENDIX
Kolmogorov±Smirnov statistics for extreme value distributions As part of a statistical analysis which involves ®tting a parametric model, it is always advisable to check the adequacy of the model. A formal test of goodnessof-®t or a more appropriate statistical analysis can be used. Here it is suggested that the Kolmogorov±Smirnov statistics be used for testing if the database originated from an extreme value distribution or not.
The test of ®t presented here is based on the article of Chandra et al. (1981) . They proposed a test which considers the Kolmogorov±Smirnov statistics D , D À , D and the Kuiper statistic V given by n observations y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n .
It is important to mention that the test was originally prepared for the ®tting of a two-parameter (scale and location) distribution and the inclusion of a third parameter (shape) could cause over®tting. Graphical goodness-of-®t tests such as QQ-plots (based on comparing observed quantiles with those from the hypothesized distribution) can be used to verify the ®tness of the model but are handicapped by needing the intervention of the analyst in the tests.
The test is carried out by following the steps below. 
